Double Dip and Goodwill Considered by Wisconsin Supreme Court

Last month the Wisconsin Supreme Court weighed in on two issues that are important to family lawyers and their clients who operate professional practices like physicians, lawyers, dentists and accountants. In Marriage of McReath, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that “saleable” goodwill would be considered marital property, in a case where a dentist argued that “personal” goodwill should not be counted as part of the marital estate. The Court also held that it was not double dipping to include the dentist’s business earnings as part of his income for post-divorce alimony, after dividing the fair market value of the business based on capitalized earnings.

Lawyers, judges and valuation professionals use many different terms – often imprecisely – to describe goodwill, the intangible value of a business that exceeds the value of hard assets like inventory, equipment and receivables. Some courts distinguish between “enterprise” goodwill and “personal” goodwill; other refer to “professioinal” goodwill. As lawyers and judges have advanced along the learning curve, their usage of these terms has improved. Still, the historical record remains a fertile source of confusion.

Wisconsin’s highest court, and the advocate who must have guided the Court’s analysis, Richard J. Auerbach, Esq., of Madison, admirably honed in on the most important aspect of goodwill: whether it is transferable to a buyer. In this case, the husband had purchased two dental offices for a purchase price of more than $900,000. Thirteen years later, Wife’s expert opined that the practice was worth just under $1.1 million and testified that much of the value would be associated with a noncompete clause. While recognizing that some of the saleable goodwill might be fairly characterized as “personal” goodwill, the Supreme Court refused to assume that personal goodwill is necessarily nontransferable. The fact that Husband purchased his practice from another dentist, in a transaction where most of the purchase price was allocated to goodwill, was proof enough that personal goodwill may be transferable.

Unfortunately, the Wisconsin court’s analysis of double dipping was not especially well-reasoned. The Court made little effort to rebut Husband’s argument that it should not include earnings from the dental practice in his income when determining post-divorce alimony, after having divided up the fair market value of the business based on capitalized earnings. The Court cited its own precedent where it cautioned about an inflexible application of the prohibition against double dipping, given the “infinite range of factual situations facing circuit courts in dividing property.” The Supreme Court found that a business is more like an income-producing investment than a pension.

Actually, that analogy does not hold up upon close scrutiny. The value of an investment is equal to the account balance on a particular date, and any interest income generated after that date would be counted as income to the owner of the investment because it can be consumed without decreasing the principal of the investment. If the interest or dividends generated by an investment are counted as income, there is no double dip. On the other hand, a pension is valued by taking the net present value of the future annuity payments. Theoretically, the value of the pension is diminished as payments are received. Therefore, pension payments cannot be counted as income if the pension has been divided as property.

Generally, a business is valued in the same manner as a pension. The value of the business is equal to the net present value of the cash flow or profits that the business generates. A business valuation is a hypothetical sale of the businessin which  the owner sells the business to a hypothetical buyer, who might retain the owner as a employee (paying “reasonable market compensation”) or simply hire a new employee to do the owner’s job. If the business is sold, the owner is not entitled to receive profits, so counting those earnings as income for alimony purposes is clearly double dipping. The Wisconsin court got it wrong.

To get even more sophisticated, the courts might have examined what a dentist like this gentleman was capable of earning as an employee of someone else’s dental practice. Alimony based on earning capacity would not be a double dip. It may be reasonable to believe that a professional could sell his practice and go to work for someone else. The salary that the professional could earn elsewhere might be equal to the “reasonable compensation” that a hypothetical buyer would pay to a replacement employee, or it might be more or less (depending upon the hours, duties and skills that the owner would bring to his new job).

Furthermore, the court might consider the investment return that the owner, having sold his business for cash, would earn on the sales proceeds. That argument might have gotten more traction ten years ago than today (when CD’s pay less than 1%) but it is still worth considering.

Blazer: Double Dip Still Moribund in California

Last year I had the privilege of attending the BVR/Morningstar Summit on Best Practices in Business Valuation in Divorce, which will be held this month in Chicago. Unfortunately I have to miss it this year as I will be visiting my new niece in San Diego. They will be discussing the latest developments in business valuation and complex financial issues in divorce, including the following summary of a double-dipping decision from California, which I am posting verbatim from the BVWire blast email:

In re Marriage of Blazer, (August 25, 2009) (partially unpublished)
The California Court of Appeal considered two issues of first impression: whether an owner’s capital account in a small, closely held company should count toward his income for determining spousal support; and whether the ultimate support award, when combined with the disposition and division of the business as a going concern, constitutes an impermissible “double dip” into the income stream of the business and of the owner-spouse.

Profitable produce company. The husband owned a brokerage fruit company in California, focusing primarily on the strawberry market. The trial court valued the closely held business at $5.6 million. Although each party presented expert testimony, the record did not reveal their respective methodologies or the trial court’s determination, except to note that it used the “capitalization of excess earnings method.” It ultimately awarded the entire business to the husband and all remaining asserts to the wife, plus a $1.34 million equalization payment.

In determining the wife’s request for permanent support, the trial court also considered whether the husband’s contribution of roughly $1.4 million from his capital account to expand and integrate the company was a reasonable business expense. Due to changes in the produce industry, the “buyer-broker” entity was being phased out, the husband testified, and unless the company moved into the farming and distribution markets, it would “not exist, it will be gone.” The husband’s expert, a CPA, noted that the company was “very thinly capitalized,” and that the funds were the husband’s to invest and should not be credited as income for purposes of spousal support. The wife’s expert agreed that the business could be better capitalized, but declined to express any “legal” opinion regarding the nature of the husband’s contributions, conceding only that capital withdrawals were generally not taxable as income.

Based on this evidence, the trial court excluded the funds used to expand the business from its award of spousal support. “The need to maintain higher capitalization in the company and the need to diversify the company’s work are reasonable expenses that should not be charged against [the husband’s] income,” it said, “but rather should be taken out of the company before assessing what his reasonable income is for purposes of support.”

As a final matter, it awarded the wife $20,000 per month in permanent support—and both parties appealed. The wife claimed the trial court should have accounted for all of the husband’s income, including the funds in his capital account, before awarding maintenance, while the husband claimed the award unfairly permitted the wife to “double dip” into his business’s income stream. In other words, because the court awarded the wife half of the business’s goodwill value in the property division, which was measured by the excess earnings method, it should not have considered those same earnings in assessing his ability to pay her support.

Both arguments lack direct legal authority. The appellate court tackled the wife’s arguments first, finding nothing in California precedent directly on point. The wife offered two cases, one that permitted a trial court to consider future income from a husband’s bonuses in its award of spousal and child support; and a second case that permitted consideration of income from the future exercise of stock options. But as the husband pointed out, in those cases, the supporting spouse was an employee, not a business owner. Accordingly, the appellate court found them apposite to the current case. However, the record provided substantial support for the trial court’s factual findings regarding the nature of the business and its expenses, including testimony from the husband and his expert. Moreover, the applicable California statute requires courts to consider the “earned and unearned income and the assets of the supporting party,” the appellate court pointed out, with emphasis. Thus, the trial court acted well within its discretion by attributing the reinvested funds to the business instead of the husband, and the appellate court confirmed its alimony award.

In considering the issue of the double-dip, the court found no direct support in California case law. The husband offered cases from other jurisdictions, including New York, which prohibits courts from double-counting the income from professional licenses.  “Once a court converts a specific income stream into an asset, that income may no longer be calculated into the maintenance formula and payout,” the court noted, citing Grunfeld v. Grunfeld 709 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. App. 2000) (available at BVLaw™). At the same time, “there is no double counting to the extent that maintenance is based [on] spousal income which is not capitalized and then converted into and distributed as marital property,” the Grunfeld court held.

California courts have addressed the argument against double-dipping when dividing pension funds and determining support—but they have rejected its “superficial appeal,” this court observed. In one case, the award of spousal support extended only three years after the divorce, but in all cases, when “one spouse receives permanent . . . support from the other spouse, the source is from the separate property of the paying spouse, including . . . earnings or property which were once the community property of both spouses,” the court said (quoting a 1979 California Supreme Court opinion). Thus, it rejected the legal basis for the husband’s argument against double-dipping in divorce.

The appellate court also found no factual basis for it in the record. Unfortunately, the trial court’s orders did not explicitly identify the intangibles it valued when applying the capitalized excess earnings method to the business. Nor did it appear to have valued the business using a stream of future income belonging to the husband, the appellate court noted.  Despite testimony from the husband’s expert that “the excess earnings method of valuing goodwill in a professional corporation . . . is not far removed from a prediction about future earnings,” the court rejected the notion that this valuation method “compels a determination that [the business’s] goodwill value is tied to the husband’s future efforts.”

First, testimony by the husband’s expert—even though it was uncontradicted, was not conclusive proof of such a finding. Second, and more importantly, “an entity’s future earnings do not always correspond with the owner’s contribution of labor,” the court found. The case law has long recognized that “goodwill may exist separate and apart from the services of the person who created it.” Although goodwill and earnings may arise from the personal talents, skills, and reputation of an individual employee, their value may attach to and continue with the business even after that employee departs.

Despite lapses in the record, it sufficiently showed that the trial court valued the husband’s business without including any of his potential or continuing income, the appellate court concluded. Further, nothing in the applicable statute precluded the trial court from recognizing the husband’s future earnings as income available for spousal support, even though such income was undoubtedly his separate property; the trial court also considered the wife’s future investment earnings from her award of marital assets to determine her reasonable needs.  “To sum up, Calfornia authority offerns no basis for treating husband’s earnings from his ongoing business differently fvrom income generated by other assets divided at dissolution, for purposes of determining spousal support,” the court held, and declined to adopt any prohibition against the double-dip in divorce.

This summary suggests that California jurisprudence remains relatively unsophisticated on this important issue, which I might explain in the following way: a business valuation is a hypothetical sale of the business. If the business were sold in conjunction with the divorce, the business owner would receive a price equal to the fair market value yielded by the business valuation. That price is the marital asset that is divided in equitable distribution. The former owner of the business might then have to get a job, where he or she might earn a salary equal to the “reasonable compensation” element of the business valuation. Any future support obligation might be based on the reasonable compensation figure, but must not be based on excess salary and/or business profits that the owner might have received prior to the hypothetical sale, because the owner is no longer receiving such benefits after the “sale.”  The divorce court must not consider the business owner’s actual compensation and profits when calculating post-divorce support obligations. On the other hand, any support obligations imposed prior to the divorce (i.e., prior to the hypothetical sale) may be based on the owner’s entire compensation and profits because the double dip does not occur until the business is “sold.” The court in Blazer seemed to miss this concept in its analysis.

One of my colleagues believes that there is a flaw in the double dipping argument when applied to business valuation because the business may continue to generate profits in the distant future.  Mathematically, a business valuation is a net present value calculation, derived from the sum of the profits generated by the business year after year into infinity. Valuation is not based upon profits for a limited period of time; it is unlimited. By viewing the valuation as a hypothetical sale, this concept is easier to understand. A business owner will not receive profits at any future time period after selling the business.

Blazer demonstrates the importance of building a record at the trial court level and explaining valuation concepts in concrete terms. It is easy for a court to misconstrue esoteric terms like “goodwill,” but it seems unlikely that an expert could deny that fair market value implies a hypothetical sale, or that valuation is the net present value of an infinite series of annual profits.

More on Blazer: Retained Earnings Not Income for Alimony

 

The California Court of Appeal’s decision in Marriage of Blazer (2009) dealt not only with double dipping, but also with the exclusion of a company’s retained earnings when determining the owner’s income subject to an alimony obligation. After a 20 year marriage, Husband and Wife divorced, the husband retaining ownership of a berry distribution business. At trial, the husband’s expert testified that the berry company was thinly capitalized for its gross revenue. Wife’s expert agreed (if not grudgingly) that some earnings must be retained for capital reserves. The trial court excluded these retained earnings from the husband’s income for alimony purposes.

The husband’s expert also testified that retailers were seeking to eliminate middlemen, forcing the business to integrate vertically. The capital expenditures to purchase a growing farm and expand distribution were not added back to the company’s income, despite wife’s argument that husband “chose” to incur those expenses and would benefit from the enhancement in the company’s value. Again, the trial court adopted the position of the husband’s expert, over the opposition of wife’s expert.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision under an “abuse of discretion” standard. The Court noted that there is no statutory definition of “income” for alimony cases in California, and it was unclear whether retained earnings could be properly categorized as “income” for alimony purposes. Case law held that the child support definition of “income” did not apply to alimony cases.

Blazer: California Considers Double-Dipping and Personal Goodwill

BVWire.com reported this week on a recent California case where the issue of double dipping was examined in the context of divorcing business owners:

The husband owned a produce company in California, valued at $5.6 million, ostensibly under the capitalization/excess earnings method. After a marriage of “long duration and substantial standard of living,” the trial court awarded the wife $20,000 per month in spousal support plus half ($2.8 million) of the business. The husband appealed, urging a blanket prohibition against double dipping—i.e., using the same stream of earnings to determine business value/property division and also support.

In Blazer v. Blazer (No. DR 38292, Aug. 25, 2009), the California Court of Appeals discusses the excess earnings method and, in particular, the myriad ways to distinguish personal from enterprise goodwill. It also considers the double-dipping precedent from other jurisdictions as well as its own cases concerning pension divisions. In the end, the court sidesteps the issue by finding insufficient proof that the husband’s expert in fact valued the business by capitalizing his future income stream. Moreover, “the earnings of an ongoing business…do not always derive solely from the personal efforts of its operator, nor is there evidence that such is the case here.” The court explicitly confirmed the equity of the spousal award in this case as well as the trial court’s implicit determination that there was no double counting of the husband’s income.

Thus, the question remains open in California and elsewhere—especially for cases concerning owners of a professional firm or solo practice whose interests are valued under the excess earnings method. Look for a full summary of Blazer and our continuing analysis of double dipping in the November Business Valuation Update™.

This weekend I am in Chicago to attend the BVR Divorce Conference. I will read the case and many others while I am there, so I will have much to report about when I return!

Executive Compensation: Excessive Salary or Disguised Dividend?

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took up the case of Menard v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (2009), considering whether the CEO of a privately-held company was receiving a dividend disguised as salary from the business he controlled. The CEO whose salary was questioned was John Menard, founder and controlling shareholder of Menards, a chain of retail hardware and building supply stores. The Tax Court took the position that John Menard’s $20 million salary was really a disguised dividend because it was much greater than the salaries of the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs, who earned $2.8 million and $6.1 million respectively.

The appellate court’s opinion in this case is so well-researched that I cannot help but include large blocks of text, starting with its introduction to the subject:

The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered,”[or] “payments purely for services.” Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it’s really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation’s taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. . . As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries—15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax. But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. . . . Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain—except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that “of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries,” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a “salary” check. A difficult case—which is this case—is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a “reasonable” salary as the amount that “would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,” § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives’ compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury’s standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. [Citations omitted.] We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision [citations omitted]; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. . . . All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different.

In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee’s compensation is “reasonable,” we created the presumption that “when . . . the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee’s] salary is presumptively reasonable.” But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company’s success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company’s land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839.

The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing “unreasonable” compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. [Citations omitted.] Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if—but it is a big if—the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case.

Having explained the context of this case, the Circuit Court next explained why the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong, especially its comparison of John Menard’s salary to the salaries earned by the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs in that year. The appellate court first rejected the notion that the taxpayer’s $17 million bonus, which was equal to 5% of the company’s net income before taxes, was more likely to be a dividend than salary because it was paid at year’s end; was approved by a board that the CEO controlled without outside directors; must be returned if the IRS should disallow the company’s tax deduction as salary; and exceeded the salaries earned by the CEOs of publicly-traded competitors (Home Depot and Lowe’s). The appellate court noted that the managers of privately-held companies often face greater risk than public companies, warranting greater reward for success:

Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and “specific human” capital tied up in his job. [Citations omitted.] So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive’s salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive’s salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year—high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard’s average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million—a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard’s total compensation would have been only $157,500—less than the salary of a federal judge—even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would
have a great-looking case?

The appellate court also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the total compensation packages of the CEOs from the public companies, such as equity compensation, severance packages, retirement plans, and perks. The appellate court noted that the CEO of Home Depot, whose salary was used as a benchmark, actually earned $124 million over six years, and a $210 million severance package when he was forced out. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the salaries of other senior managers, both of Menards and of the benchmark public companies, which may have indicated that this CEO was more productive and delegated less than average. The Court observed that John Menard worked 14 to 16 hours per day, six to seven days per week.

The Seventh Circuit adopted a skeptical, even sarcastic, tone toward the Tax Court’s remark that the owner of a business has no need for incentive compensation because ownership is incentive enough. The Court of Appeals held that owners should not be treated differently from other managers.

Having concluded that John Menard’s $20 million salary was not excessive, the Court of Appeals reversed.

Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part V

This is the last in a series of posts containing summaries of Pennsylvania case law on the issue of double dipping in divorce. “Double dipping” occurs when an income-producing asset (such as a pension or business) is counted as marital property subject to equitable distribution, as well as income subject to an alimony or child support obligation.

Steneken v. Steneken, 873 A.2d 501 (N.J. 2005).

Although it is not a Pennsylvania decision, no discussion of double dipping would be complete without Steneken, a 2005 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. In this case, the husband was the sole owner of a business which was marital property subject to equitable distribution. The valuation expert performed a normalization of the owner’s compensation in his report, reducing the company’s salary expense and thereby increasing the value of the company. In determining an alimony award, the husband argued that the court should consider his lower, normalized compensation instead of his actual salary (since the excess compensation had been capitalized as part of the business valuation and divided as marital property). The trial court accepted the husband’s argument and used his normalized salary instead of his actual salary.

An appeal ensued, and the case was remanded to the trial court because the intermediate appellate court held that the record was not fully developed. On remand, the trial court reversed its earlier position and used the husband’s actual salary to determine the proper amount of alimony.

The intermediate appellate court, reviewing New Jersey’s divorce statute, held that the prohibition on “double dipping” extended only to pensions and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The husband appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court to extend the principle to double dipping arising from the capitalization of earnings in the context of a business valuation. Since an income capitalization approach had been used by the valuation expert endorsed by the trial court, and was not challenged, the husband argued that he should not have to pay alimony from the excess compensation that had been capitalized and distributed as part of the value of the business.

The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s decision to permit double dipping. Rather than adopting the intermediate court’s rationale, the New Jersey high court attacked the husband’s reasoning.

The logical flaw in defendant’s argument lies at its core. Defendant mistakenly equates the statutory and decisional methodology applied ni the calculation of alimony with a valuation methodology applied for equitable distribution purposes that requires that revenues and expenses, including salaries, be normalized so as to present a fair valuation of a going concern. Simply said, defendant’s charged mischaracterization of the issue here as one of “double counting” both misstakes the issue and ignores the fundamental principles that undergird related yet nonetheless severable alimony and equitable distribution awards.  As our statutory framework and decisional precedent make clear, the proper issue is whether, under the circumstances, the alimony awarded and the equitable distribution made are, both singly and together, fair and consistent with the statutory design. . . . Because we embrace the premise that alimony and equitable distribution calculations, albeit interrelated, are separate, distinct, and not entirely compatible financial exercises, and because asset valuation methodologies applied in the equitable distribution context are not congruent with the factors relevant to alimony considerations, we conclude that the circumstances here present a fair and proper method of both awarding alimony and determining equitable distribution.

The New Jersey court’s opinion is not convincing; other reasons might have been more forceful. For instance, the court might have started with the observation that a business valuation expert ordinarily has no expertise in executive compensation. To identify part of the owner’s salary as excessive is tantamount to saying that the business could hire someone to do the job for less, or conversely, the owner would earn less if he or she sought employment elsewhere. Such determinations are beyond the expertise of most valuation experts, and should not be relied upon to determine the owner’s earning capacity for alimony and support purposes. Yet, if those normalization adjustments are not suitable to determine the owner’s earning capacity, why should we rely on them for the business valuation?

The New Jersey court noted that if a different valuation methodology had been applied, there might be no normalization adjustment to the owner’s salary. That is true, in the case of an asset approach. However, an asset approach assumes liquidation of the company, not ongoing concern value. The owner’s excess compensation does not get capitalized under the asset approach, so there is no possibility of double dipping. In the market approach, normalization of the income statement or cash flow is performed before applying a multiplier. Therefore, the potential inconsistency perceived by the Court is illusory.

In a vigorous and well-reasoned dissent, three of the seven Justices enunciated a compromise position: that the trial court need not use normalized compensation when computing the owner’s alimony obligation but should have discretion to adjust the value of the business or the alimony award to alleviate the double dip.

Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part IV

This is the fourth in a series of posts containing summaries of Pennsylvania case law on the issue of double dipping in divorce. “Double dipping” occurs when an income-producing asset (such as a pension or business) is counted as marital property subject to equitable distribution, as well as income subject to an alimony or child support obligation.

McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180 (Pa.Super.1989).

            McFadden was a post-divorce alimony modification proceeding.  In this case, the husband’s pension annuity benefit was in pay status, and he was receiving the entire pension benefit. Yet, the court found that the husband’s pension had not been identified as marital property at the time of equitable distribution. Therefore, the Superior Court did not reverse the trial court’s calculation of the husband’s income, which included the pension benefit. Most troubling, in dicta, the Superior Court held (per Popovich, J.): “[I]t is equally clear that income from a pension is to be considered when fashioning an alimony award, even if the pension was previously subjected to equitable distribution. See 23 Pa.S.A. § 501(b)(3), (10), (13); Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa.Super. 178, 190, 2492 A.2d 707, 711-712 (1985)(court did not err in consideration earlier equitable distribution property in fashioning alimony); Braderman, 488 A.2d at 620 (pension subject to equitable distribution also may be used to calculate alimony award).”

Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part III

This is the third in a series of posts containing summaries of Pennsylvania case law on the issue of double dipping in divorce. “Double dipping” occurs when an income-producing asset (such as a pension or business) is counted as marital property subject to equitable distribution, as well as income subject to an alimony or child support obligation.

Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832 (Pa. Super. 2001)

In Miller, the parties settled their division of property, and Wife subsequently sought a modification of child support based on the income that Husband derived from the sale of his share of marital assets. The Superior Court held that the proceeds from the sale of assets were not “income” within the statutory definition. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify child support when the payor received proceeds from the sale of marital assets after the divorce and division of property. The double dip in Miller was another reason for the Court’s decision.

Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 1998).

            Rohrer was the first published decision to prohibit double dipping in Pennsylvania. (Interestingly, the opinion was written by Judge Popovich, who had held in McFadden that double dipping was permitted.) In Rohrer, the husband was an owner of a business organized as a Subchapter “S” corporation. At an early stage of the proceedings, the pass-through earnings of the business were included in the husband’s income when calculating his support obligations. At equitable distribution, the husband asked the master to exclude retained earnings from the value of the business, in order to avoid double dipping. Husband’s request was granted by the master, but only to the extent that retained earnings from the date of the support order forward into the future were excluded. The retained earnings that accrued prior to the support order were counted as part of the value of the business.

            The trial court reversed the master’s decision and excluded all of the retained earnings. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and adopted the master’s finding. The Superior Court held that “money included in an individual’s income for the purpose of calculating support payments may not also be labeled as a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.” Rohrer, at 465.

Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part II

This is the second in a series of posts containing summaries of Pennsylvania case law on the issue of double dipping in divorce. “Double dipping” occurs when an income-producing asset (such as a pension or business) is counted as marital property subject to equitable distribution, as well as income subject to an alimony or child support obligation.

Cerny v. Cerny, 656 A.2d 507 (Pa.Super.1995).

            Prior to separation, the husband received a cash severance payment, which was counted as income in determining his support obligation. The severance payment was excluded (in a prior, unpublished Superior Court decision) from the marital estate to avoid double dipping. Subsequently, the IRS issued a tax refund to the husband, as the severance payment was not taxable income. The trial court held that the tax refund should be counted as marital property. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the tax refund retained the same nonmarital nature as the income from which it was derived. The opinion does not reveal whether the tax was deducted from the payor’s income when determining his support obligation, but if so, then the result may have been inequitable.

Basics of Pennsylvania Law: Double Dip, Part I

The concept of a “double dip” is logical and intuitive. If an income-producing asset has been awarded to a party in equitable distribution, the same asset cannot be counted as a source of income from which alimony may be paid. For instance, a pension in pay status cannot be counted as income for alimony purposes if it was also a marital asset that has been divided in equitable distribution. This concept has been recognized and adopted by the Pennsylvania courts at the trial and appellate levels. Butler v. Butler, 541 Pa. 364, 663 A.2d 148, 156 (1995)(professional goodwill); Diament v. Diament, 816 A.2d 256, 277 (Pa.Super.2003)(advance of marital assets); Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832 (Pa.Super. 2001)(proceeds from sale of marital property); Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463 (Pa.Super. 1998)(retained earnings of a business); Kokolis v. Kokolis, 83 Pa.D. & C.4th 214 (Ally. 2006)(pension in pay status), affirmed, 927 A.2d 663 (Pa.Super. 2007); cf. McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180 (Pa.Super.1989)(pension in pay status).

This post is the first of a series describing Pennsylvania case law concerning the double dip.

Berry v. Berry, 898 A.2d 110 (Pa.Super.2006).

The husband in this case was terminated from his employment as a partner in an accounting firm just weeks after the commencement of a support claim within a divorce action. Upon his termination, the husband received a distribution of his partnership capital account plus a cash severance payment equal to seven months’ base salary. The wife argued at the trial court level that neither of these items should be included in the husband’s income when determining his child support obligation. (The husband had secured other employment paying a salary sufficient to justify a Melzer analysis.) The trial court held that the capital account distribution and cash severance were income for support purposes. The wife appealed, prompting the Superior Court to vacate and remand the case.

The Superior Court held that the partnership capital account was marital property which should not have been included in the husband’s income because doing so would constitute a double dip.  On the other hand, the Superior Court held that the cash severance payment was strictly income. In its decision, the Court distinguished between money earned prior to the marital separation (in this case, a partnership capital account) and money acquired after separation (in this case, a severance payment). Since the partnership capital account was acquired prior to separation, it fell within the statutory definition of marital property. The cash severance acquired after separation did not.  The Superior Court held that the capital account was marital property while the severance payment was income. In both of its findings, the Superior Court refused to double dip.