Double Dipping … again

At the Pennsylvania Bar Association Family Law Section Winter Meeting 2009, which took place at the William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh this weekend, a panel of judges, lawyers and CPAs discussed hot topics in family law and business valuation. One of the hot topics, presented by Pittsburgh valuation professional Richard F. Brabender, was double dipping. Specifically, this seminar discussed the theoretical/academic argument (which I have advocated in this blog) that a double dip exists where capitalized income which has been divided between the spouses as marital property is also counted as income for child support or alimony purposes.

Clearly, if there is a pension in pay status which is valued on the date of trial, and the pension annuity benefit is counted as income for calculating post-divorce alimony, the court has divided the same stream of income twice – a “double dip.” This same problem exists where business profits have been capitalized as part of the valuation process and also included in the business owner’s net income for child support and alimony purposes.

The twist that Dick Brabender brought to light in his presentation was the double dip that may occur during the separation, where the owner’s compensation substantially exceeds a market salary. For instance, if a business owner is drawing $500,000 per year from the business, but could hired a newly-minted MBA (because we all know how they can improve any business) to do the owner’s job for $70,000 a year, then the owner is receiving excessive compensation of $430,000 per year. Why shouldn’t the business owner’s spouse get 50% of the excess compensation during the separation period as an advance against his or her share of the marital property (assuming the business is entirely marital), subject to re-allocation at the time of trial? (The excess compensation would then be excluded from both spouses’ incomes for support purposes.) This is the likely result if there were a marital pension in pay status, which could be divided 50/50 during the pendency of litigation as an advance of marital property.

In order to accomplish this interim division of the business income stream, the court would have to conduct a hearing to determine that the owner’s compensation were excessive, something the court is unlikely to decide in motions court. Moreover, the excess compensation hearing would have to occur prior to the support or maintenance hearing so that there were no inconsistencies between the support order and the property advance. One of the panelists, eastern Pennsylvania lawyer Mark Ashton, suggested that the court would also have to look at whether the rents being paid by the business to the owner were consistent with market levels, whether the owner were working more than 40 hours a week, etc. Suddenly a simple hearing to determine a property advance has become a multi-day trial with multiple expert witnesses!

Another panelist, Jay Blechman, suggested an alternative: a lookback at the time of the final property division trial. In other words, if it were proven at the end of the case that the owner’s compensation during the pendency of litigation was above-market, then the court could re-designate the excessive income as marital property and award an incremental amount to the owner’s spouse. In Pennsylvania, a business owner’s spouse without children would receive 40% of the income stream as support or maintenance, but if the excess compensation were marital property, the spouse might 50%, 55% or more. So, Jay Blechman suggested that the business owner’s spouse could get 40% during the pendency of the case, and an additional 10%, 15% or more of the excessive compensation at the end of the case.

No case law supports this idea yet.

Variations on a Double Dip Theme: The Moore Case

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued a decision in May 2006 that addresses the lingering question of whether gains from the sale of marital property may be included in income for child support purposes: the old “double dip” dilemma. In Moore (2006), the partial owner of a cycle shop settled his divorce in 1991, retaining his interest in the business as part of his equitable distribution. Child support was set at the time of the divorce, and modified later based on an increase in the owner’s salary.

Years later, the business owner sold his interest in the cycle shop to his sister, who was the other owner. In exchange for his interest and a non-compete clause, the seller received 20% of the sales proceeds up front and a five year note in monthly installments with interest. When the former wife of the seller filed a petition for modification of child support, alleging an increase in the father’s income due to the sale of the business, the trial court determined that the sales proceeds should not be included in his income for support purposes.

On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that the statutory definition of income in that state includes “capital gains.” Yet, the father in this case relied upon a Tennessee precedent that excludes “isolated capital gains” from income. Moreover, Father cited a Tennessee law which provides that “assets distributed as marital property will not be considered as income for child support or alimony purposes, except to the extent that asset will create additional income after the division.”

The Tennessee Court of Appeals remanded to determine what portion of the proceeds received by the husband from the sale of his business interest could be considered “additional income” under Tennessee law. At first blush, it appeared that the Tennessee court blurred the distinction between the net income or profits generated by a business (which are included in the value to be divided in an equitable distribution proceeding) and passive income such as interest, dividends and capital gains on marketable securities (which are truly “created” after the division of property).

Yet, the Moore opinion set forth a methodology which intentionally or unintentionally measures the portion of the sales proceeds that were not divided in equitable distribution. The appellate court held that the difference between the actual sales proceeds and the value used in equitable distribution should be divided pro rata over the five year payback period as “additional income.” In essence, the Tennessee court pro-rated the margin of error between the valuation and the actual sale price. That seems to be an appropriate way of capturing the difference between theory and practice.