Effectively Waiving Retirement Benefits in a Settlement Agreement

During the statewide broadcast of PBI’s Family Law Update today, my colleague David Ladov asked me to post the features that a marital settlement agreement would have to contain in order to qualify as a QDRO (qualified domestic relations order). A QDRO is one of two possible ways that someone may waive his or her right to receive a share of his or her ex-spouse’s retirement benefits (the other being a beneficiary designation form). According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Kennedy v. Dupont, a marital settlement agreement by itself was not good enough to waive an ex-wife’s interest in an employer-sponsored pension plan, in the absence of a QDRO or beneficiary designation form.

I suggested during the broadcast that some divorce lawyers might wish to avoid this problem by crafting marital settlement agreements that would qualify as QDROs.  The requirements for QDROs under federal law are summarized on the website of the employee benefits administrator Hewitt Associates, as follows:

  1. The instrument must be a court order, judgment or decree signed by a judge or other state-approved court official.
  2. The instrument must relate to marital property rights or alimony, or the support of a child of the participant.
  3. The instrument must contain a statement that it is issued pursuant to state domestic relations law.
  4. The instrument must include the name, last known address, social security number and date of birth of the participant and alternate payee.
  5. The instrument must describe the amount or percentage of benefits to be awarded to the alternate payee.
  6. The instrument must indicate the manner of payment and when payments begin.

There are a couple of additional requirements (actually, three things the QDRO cannot do) that are described on Hewitt’s web site. In a case where a spouse is waiving his or her rights to an ex-spouse’s retirement benefits, these last few requirements might be irrelevant.

The first requirement listed above could be an obstacle in counties where settlement agreements are not routinely attached to the divorce decree or filed of record. Yet, a consent order incorporating a marital settlement agreement should be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. It is less clear that a consent order referring to an unattached settlement agreement might satisfy the requirement.

Buy-Sell Held Controlling Where Wife Signed

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently held that a business owner’s spouse who signed a buy-sell agreement was bound by the value in a divorce action. In Inzer (2009), the husband and wife both signed a buy-sell agreement when they formed an LLC to purchase a Sonic Drive-In franchise. The buy-sell agreement granted other partners a right of first refusal to buy the interests of a withdrawing partner for the lesser of book value or the offer procured by the withdrawing partner. The owner’s expert presented evidence that the owner’s 24% interest in the franchise was worth $120,000 to $135,000 using capitalized cash flow or market methods, but only $16,000 net book value after discounts. Wife’s expert testified to a value of more than $500,000 after making adjustments to the owners’ compensation and ignoring discounts for lack of marketability, lack of control or the restrictive operating agreement.

The trial court valued the owner’s interest at $200,000 without much explanation. The Tennessee Court reversed, holding that the franchise was worth $33,000 book value without consideration of intangible value or discounts (as specified in the buy-sell agreement). The appellate court distinguished cases in which buy-sell agreements were not controlling, since the non-owner spouse in those cases did not sign the buy-sell.

Consider whether it was appropriate for Wife’s expert to perform  Type I adjustments in his normalization of the income statement, i.e., adjusting the owners’ compensation. Could a purchaser of a 24% interest compel the other owners to reduce their compensation? Even if the Court had not held the buy-sell to be controlling, it seems unlikely that Wife’s expert would have prevailed.

Three Signs of Enterprise Goodwill in Professional Practices

In divorce litigation where one of the spouses owns a professional practice, such as a medical practice, dental practice, law firm or accounting firm, the lawyers and their experts have to determine whether the business has value. Their determination depends upon whether the professional practice is believed to have enterprise goodwill.

Briefly, enterprise goodwill is the price that a buyer would pay for a professional practice over and above the value of its hard assets like equipment and supplies. In theoretical terms, enterprise goodwill is the reputation of the business that is not closely associated with a particular owner or professional. The opposite of enterprise goodwill is personal goodwill, which is the reputation and skill of the professional. Enterprise goodwill has value because it is transferrable but personal goodwill is not. Someone might be willing to pay for a name like Aspen Dental Systems, but what about Jane Doe, PC?

Increasingly, there is a market for professional practices that are not part of a regional or national chain. Dental practices, even those with a single location and single dentist, are bought and sold frequently. The same is true for specialty medical practics. Yet, primary care medical practices and legal practices are rarely bought or sold. So, how does a lawyer decide whether a professional practice should be evaluated by a business valuation specialist? Here are three signs that a professional practice might have value:

1. Actual transactions. If a professional or his/her partners have bought or sold their practices, it is more likely that there is transferrable enterprise goodwill. However, you must distinguish market transactions from succession planning. If the only transactions are between retiring partners and advancing associates, then there may not be much enterprise goodwill.

2.  Subordinates and equipment.  One reason why dental practices are increasingly transferrable is that dental procedures are performed by hygenists and associate dentists. If the owner of the practice is earning profit from other professionals and paraprofessionals, then a buyer might be willing to pay something to step into those shoes.

3.  Excess compensation. If a professional is earning substantially more than industry standards, then the professional’s practice might have enterprise goodwill. No buyer would pay to assume an existing practice if he or she could start a new practice for free – except if the existing practice were more profitable than a new practice would be. This criteria is based on the principle of substitution.

Executive Compensation: Excessive Salary or Disguised Dividend?

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently took up the case of Menard v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620 (2009), considering whether the CEO of a privately-held company was receiving a dividend disguised as salary from the business he controlled. The CEO whose salary was questioned was John Menard, founder and controlling shareholder of Menards, a chain of retail hardware and building supply stores. The Tax Court took the position that John Menard’s $20 million salary was really a disguised dividend because it was much greater than the salaries of the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs, who earned $2.8 million and $6.1 million respectively.

The appellate court’s opinion in this case is so well-researched that I cannot help but include large blocks of text, starting with its introduction to the subject:

The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered,”[or] “payments purely for services.” Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it’s really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation’s taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. . . As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries—15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax. But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. . . . Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain—except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that “of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries,” Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a “salary” check. A difficult case—which is this case—is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a “reasonable” salary as the amount that “would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,” § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives’ compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury’s standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. [Citations omitted.] We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir.1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision [citations omitted]; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. . . . All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different.

In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee’s compensation is “reasonable,” we created the presumption that “when . . . the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee’s] salary is presumptively reasonable.” But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company’s success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company’s land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839.

The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing “unreasonable” compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. [Citations omitted.] Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if—but it is a big if—the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case.

Having explained the context of this case, the Circuit Court next explained why the Tax Court’s analysis was wrong, especially its comparison of John Menard’s salary to the salaries earned by the Home Depot and Lowe’s CEOs in that year. The appellate court first rejected the notion that the taxpayer’s $17 million bonus, which was equal to 5% of the company’s net income before taxes, was more likely to be a dividend than salary because it was paid at year’s end; was approved by a board that the CEO controlled without outside directors; must be returned if the IRS should disallow the company’s tax deduction as salary; and exceeded the salaries earned by the CEOs of publicly-traded competitors (Home Depot and Lowe’s). The appellate court noted that the managers of privately-held companies often face greater risk than public companies, warranting greater reward for success:

Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and “specific human” capital tied up in his job. [Citations omitted.] So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive’s salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive’s salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year—high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard’s average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million—a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard’s total compensation would have been only $157,500—less than the salary of a federal judge—even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would
have a great-looking case?

The appellate court also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the total compensation packages of the CEOs from the public companies, such as equity compensation, severance packages, retirement plans, and perks. The appellate court noted that the CEO of Home Depot, whose salary was used as a benchmark, actually earned $124 million over six years, and a $210 million severance package when he was forced out. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Tax Court had not considered the salaries of other senior managers, both of Menards and of the benchmark public companies, which may have indicated that this CEO was more productive and delegated less than average. The Court observed that John Menard worked 14 to 16 hours per day, six to seven days per week.

The Seventh Circuit adopted a skeptical, even sarcastic, tone toward the Tax Court’s remark that the owner of a business has no need for incentive compensation because ownership is incentive enough. The Court of Appeals held that owners should not be treated differently from other managers.

Having concluded that John Menard’s $20 million salary was not excessive, the Court of Appeals reversed.

Once You Pop the Question, How Do You Spring the Prenup?

Once You Pop the Question, How Do You Spring the Prenup?

Asking your fiance for a prenup doesn’t have to spoil the joy of your engagement. Personal finance experts agree that prenuptial agreements are an effective way for couples to make financial plans for their future. More than one-third of all couples say they would like to have a prenuptial agreement, according to a recent survey. A prenuptial agreement can address important topics like spending, credit card debt, and estate planning, as well as protecting family businesses and premarital assets, providing for children’s needs, and avoiding costly, protracted litigation in the event of a divorce. These three tips might make the conversation easier to have:

Allow enough time.

First, give your betrothed plenty of time to think about it. No one likes to be rushed. You know how crazy it can be to make wedding arrangements, so don’t let the prenup be the last thing on the list. A good rule of thumb would be three to six months before the wedding.

Create a context.

Next, help your fiance to understand why you need a prenup and how it fits into the “big picture.” You might want to present the prenup along with wills, health care powers of attorney, living wills, insurance policies, and other estate planning documents. The prenup is just one of several documents that will establish the financial foundation of the marriage.

Get independent legal counsel.

Finally, encourage your fiance to hire independent legal counsel. You might even offer to pay the bill. This step will allow your fiance to ask questions that might be uncomfortable for you or your lawyer to answer, and it may ensure that the agreement will be enforceable.