IRS Eliminates Two Year Limit on Innocent Spouse Equitable Relief

In July 2011, the IRS changed its policy that once imposed a two year limit on innocent spouses seeking certain forms of relief from tax penalties and interest caused by their spouse’s misreporting on joint tax returns. A recent article from the Washington Post explained:

Under the innocent spouse umbrella are three types of relief — the innocent spouse provision itself (a tough enough contention to prove), plus categories for separation of liability and equitable relief. The removal of the two-year limit only affects requests under the equitable relief provision.

You have to meet several conditions to qualify for the innocent spouse relief provision, which relieves you of responsibility for paying tax, interest and penalties if your spouse did something wrong on your joint tax return. One of the conditions is that you have to establish that at the time you signed the joint return, you did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was an understatement of tax.

Under separation of liability, the IRS essentially allows the innocent spouse to pay the taxes he or she is responsible for and then pursues the other spouse (or former spouse) for his or her understatement of taxes, including interest and penalties.

If you do not qualify for either of the first two provisions, then you can try for equitable relief, which is a sort of catchall provision that allows the IRS to consider additional factors. For example, you didn’t know your spouse or former spouse misappropriated money intended to pay your joint tax bill for his or her benefit.

The third form of relief described in the article – called “equitable relief” – was previously banned if the innocent spouse did not apply within two years from the date when the tax deficiency was identified. Today, innocent spouses may apply for equitable relief even if two years have passed. Innocent spouses who previously applied and were denied due to the two year limit may re-apply. More information is available in IRS Publication 971.

Does Payroll Tax Holiday Create Right to Modify Child Support?

Before it adjourned in December, the previous Congress passed a sweeping income tax reform bill designed to extend the Bush tax cuts for a couple more years. One important feature of that law, which goes into effect in January 2011, is a “payroll tax holiday.” Workers who earn wages and salaries must pay 6.2% for Social Security payroll taxes until they reach  earned income of $106,800 per year. All earned income above $106,800 is exempt from Social Security payroll tax.

Additionally, workers pay 1.45% of their earned income for Medicare payroll taxes. There is no cap on the earned income subject to Medicare tax.

Self-employed persons pay 12.4% Social Security tax up to $106,800 plus 2.9% Medicare tax.

Under the recently-enacted tax law, the Social Security payroll tax has been reduced by 2% for the year 2011. That means that someone earning $106,800 will save nearly $200 per month in Social Security payroll taxes. Self-employed persons will also save 2% (not 4%) on their Social Security taxes in 2011.

What does this mean for child support? Under Pennsylvania law, a change in the law which has a material effect on child support is considered a “change in circumstances” warranting modification. It is conceivable that this change in the law may affect many child support cases throughout the Commonwealth. Since the law may affect payors and/or recipients, it is difficult to predict what effect it will have across the board, but it will certainly make a difference in some cases. My advice: contact your divorce lawyer, run the numbers, and negotiate a temporary modification in child support.

But do it soon: the Social Security payroll tax goes back to normal in 2012.

What’s the Hullabaloo about Balicki?

In Balicki v. Balicki, 2010 Pa.Super.134 (2010), the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to discount the value of an insurance business, based on the hypothetical income taxes that would be incurred by its owner upon sale of the business. The trial court’s decision was itself a reversal of the master’s report, in which the master found that the tax discount was inappropriate because the owner would not likely sell the business (which had been in the family for more than two generations).

The decision is based on the 2005 amendments to the Pennsylvania Divorce Code (specifically, § 3502(a)(10.1) and (10.2)), which require the divorce court to consider tax consequences and costs of sale associated with marital assets, even if those taxes and costs are not imminent or certain. Balicki is also the result of an “abuse of discretion” standard of appellate review in Pennsylvania divorce cases, which affirms the trial court’s decision unless it is manifestly unreasonable.

In the September/October 2010 edition of The Value Examiner, the magazine of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts (NACVA), authors Meg Holland and Maureen Thomas proclaim that Balicki will affect divorce cases across the United States. In their article, the authors draw a parallel that may be difficult for some (even me, an experienced divorce lawyer and accredited valuation analyst) to follow.  Balicki, they say, is the antithesis of Bernier, a 2007 Massachusetts Supreme Court decision that established “fair value” (as opposed to fair market value) as the value standard in Massachusetts divorces.

Balicki is no Bernier, however. First, Balicki is an intermediate appellate court decision, the opinion of three out of the fifteen Superior Court judges, not a Supreme Court decision. Second, Balicki does not change the value standard in Pennsylvania (not that Holland and Thomas are saying that; they aren’t). Sure, Balicki has been interpreted in some outposts as the death knell for the argument that tax discounts may be ignored in cases where the owners never intend to sell. Yet, many of us read Balicki as a decision that stands on its own factual and evidentiary record. The panel in Balicki specifically found insufficient evidence to prove that the owner of the insurance business would never sell. In spite of Balicki, I still maintain that tax and sales cost discounts are not mandatory in every business valuation case.

I would also venture to guess that the wife’s camp did not argue strongly enough that the taxes and expenses were already considered as part of the marketability discount in the business valuation. Had that argument been made cogently at the master’s level, it is possible that the master and trial court would have adopted that position, and the Superior Court under an abuse of discretion would have affirmed.

The Holland and Thomas article leads to some interesting topics for reflection, such as: how do you calculate the hypothetical taxes that a seller would incur when selling an equipment-intensive business whose equipment was fully or greatly depreciated? The depreciation recapture analysis would seem to require a good equipment appraisal.

The Valuation Examiner article also contains an outright mistake: the authors state incorrectly that § 3502(a)(10.1) and (10.2)  were enacted in 1988, prior to the Pennsylania Supreme Court’s decision in Hovis (1988), which held that tax consequences could not be considered unless imminent and certain. (Actually, those statutes were enacted in 2005. The 1988 recodification of the Divorce Code was silent on the tax issue.)  The authors go on to say that three subsequent divorce decisions, including two out-of-state Supreme Court decisions, were incorrectly decided in reliance on Hovis, which the authors mistakenly regard as bad law.

Of course, Hovis was the law of Pennsylvania until the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted § 3502(a)(10.1) and (10.2) in 2005. During our discussion at the 14th Annual Family Law Update (November 2010), it was the consensus of four leading divorce lawyers that Balicki was an unremarkable decision.  It just means that the next lawyer who wants to argue that tax discounts should not be applied must work that much harder. Still, let’s see what happens in January 2011, when the PBA Family Law Section devotes an entire 90 minute seminar to this case.

Alimony Tax Gross-Up Approved

In Balicki v. Balicki, 2010 PA Super. 134 (July 30, 2010), the Superior Court considered the husband’s argument that the alimony order provided more income to his ex-wife than she could spend (as shown by her budgetary expenses). The trial court in its opinion justified the alimony award by noting that the wife would pay income tax on her alimony award, thereby reducing the after-tax dollars available to her. The trial court presented a seemingly reverse-engineered analysis of available income sources to prove that the income nearly matched wife’s claimed budgetary needs, thereby vindicating the result.

An important element of the trial court’s opinion was its calculation of the ex-wife’s income tax liability arising from her alimony award. The trial court held, and the Superior Court agreed, that a tax “gross-up” may be warranted under 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(15), one of the 17 statutory criteria for judging alimony claims. The trial court’s tax gross-up was triple the provision recommended by the master, but the trial court also disapproved the master’s inflated budget. These two adjustments offset each other, and the trial court affirmed the result reached by the master on different grounds.

The husband argued that the trial court had no right to reconsider the tax gross-up since neither party raised the issue in their exceptions from the master’s report. The Superior Court agreed that the trial court was not limited to the issues specifically raised on exceptions. Ironically, the Superior Court dismissed all of the husband’s allegations of error pertaining to specific items on wife’s budget, holding that they were waived because they were not specifically identified in the § 1925 statement.

All of the ex-wife’s issues on appeal, most of which seemed to be calculated to counter-balance husband’s appeals, were dismissed by the Superior Court, which affirmed the rationale of the trial court.

Dividing CRATs and CRUTs in Divorce

A recently-issued IRS ruling (Rev.Rul.2008-41) addressed the issue of whether a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT) or charitable remander unitrust (CRUT) can be divided into two equal trusts upon divorce. A charitable remainder annuity trust is a trust in which the grantor receives income in the form of an annuity payment until his or her death, after which the trust principal is donated to charity. The annuity may not be less than 5% nor more than 50% of the trust principal. A CRUT is the same thing, except that the income payments are a fixed percentage of the principal.

Rev.Rul. 2008-41 established that it is possible to divide a CRAT or CRUT into two equal trusts whose terms are identical to the original trust, except that each spouse is the income beneficiary of one of the two resulting trusts. The resulting trusts are qualified as CRATs or CRUTs under IRS regulations, and no excise tax is triggered by the division of the trusts.

A more detailed article on this subject is available from our friends at Strategic Valuation Group in Warren, Ohio.

This post is not intended as tax advice and should not be used to avoid tax penalties by our readers, who should seek tax advice that is specific to their individual circumstances.

Divorce Legal Fees: Tax Deductible?

This time each year, divorce lawyers everywhere face the same question from clients: are my legal fees are tax-deductible? For guidance on the subject, I turn to the definitive treatise: Divorce Taxation by Melvin B.  Frumkes. The main principal to keep in mind, when considering whether legal expenses are deductible, is whether they are paid or incurred for the production or collection of taxable income. IRC § 212. Legal fees incurred to collect alimony, for instance, are deductible, but legal fees related to child support are not. Legal fees related to marital dissolution are not tax-deductible, but fees for a spousal support modification proceeding are. The fees related to a divorce lawyer’s advice about tax issues – such as alimony issues, valuation and division of retirement plans, allocation of dependency exemptions, deductibility of mortgage interest, taxpayer filing status, and innocent spouse relief – are likely to qualify as deductible expenses.

Incidentally (and ironically), this post is not intended as tax advice and should not be used by any person to avoid any penalties under the Internal Revenue Code. Readers are urged to contact their divorce lawyers and qualified professionals for advice specifically suited to their factual circumstances.

SRR Answers “Taxing” Year-End Questions

The forensic accounting firm of Stout Risius Ross Advisors LLC has published an excellent guide to year-end tax questions that separated and divorcing spouses may have:

1.) What is my filing status for 2008? Your filing status is determined as of the last day of the calendar year. You are considered unmarried for the whole year if, on the last day of your tax year, you are unmarried or legally separated from your spouse under a divorce or separate maintenance decree. Your filing status will be either single or head of household.

2.) How can I qualify to file as head of household? In general, you must meet the following requirements to file as head of household.

1. You are unmarried or “considered unmarried” on the last day of the year.

2. You paid more than half the cost of keeping up a home for the year.

3. Your home was the main home of your child for more than half the year.

4. You must be able to claim an exemption for the child. However, you meet this test if you cannot claim the exemption only because you waived the right to claim the child pursuant to your divorce decree.

3.) What if my ex and I have the child an equal amount of time?
If the child lived with each parent the same amount of time during the year, the parent with the higher adjusted gross income has the right to the head of household filing status.

4.) Who claims the exemptions for our children? In most cases, a child of divorced or separated parents will qualify as a dependent of the custodial parent under the rules for a qualifying child. However, the noncustodial parent may be able to claim the exemption for the child if the special rule (discussed next) applies. Special rule for divorced or separated parents. A child will be treated as the qualifying child or qualifying relative of his or her noncustodial parent if all of the following apply.

1. The parents: a. Are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, b. Are separated under a written separation agreement, or c. Lived apart at all times during the last 6 months of the year.

2. The child received over half of his or her support for the year from the parents.

3. The child is in the custody of one or both parents for more than half of the year.

4. The custodial parent signs a written declaration, discussed later, that he or she will not claim the child as a dependent for the year, and the noncustodial parent attaches this written declaration to his or her return.

If the parents divorced or separated during the year and the child lived with both parents before the separation, the custodial parent is the one with whom the child lived for the greater part of the rest of the year.

More answers are available at SRR’s website.